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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 303 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 30/10/2000 
Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire 
minefield 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 07/11/2000 
ID original source: DH Name of source: Mounser/AVS 
2001:Z10 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
Accident report 
The following official “accident summary” was made available in January 2001. No other 
report was made. The summary was compiled by the demining group’s acting site manager. 
For obscure reasons, the country manager of the programme censored the content of the 
following before making it available. The report was dated 7th October, 23 days before the 
accident, so it is presumed that it should have been dated 7th November. 
The following text has only been further edited when necessary to conceal the identity of 
individuals and organisations involved. 
1 
On the 30th October 2000, an Anti Personnel Mine, Type R2M2, detonated app 3,5m in front 
of [the victim] without obvious reason. 
The Mine had been exposed by the minecollector [a large ground processing machine] and 
this type of mine is known as very sensitive. 
The deminer sustained minor injuries to his shoulder and was complaining about hearing loss. 
Since similar accidents happened already a few times in the past, Management suspects the 
change in temperature during the day in conjunction with the strain of being lifted and moved 
by the MC to be the most probable cause of the accident. During the investigation carried out 
by the Safety Officer, it was found, that all drills were carried out according to the SOP and 
the deminer was wearing his PPE correctly. 
The [QA] Monitor witnessed the accident and confirmed that the deminer was not closer than 
3,5m to the mine, when it went off. 
The deminer is not at fault. 
Accidents of this kind are unavoidable as long as [the company] is clearing R2M2 in 
mechanically prepared areas. 
Senior Staff has to make sure, that no one is entering the minefield without wearing full PPE. 
All violations of this rule have to be taken very serious and appropriate disciplinary action has 
to be taken immediately. 
Please find attached the accident report of the Safety Officer as well as the WCIF 14A form 
Signed:  Acting Operations Manager 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 383 Name:  Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hearing 
minor Shoulder 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
2 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is classed as “Unavoidable” because the victim appears to 
have been working properly and fallen victim to a spontaneous detonation. 
However, it was known by this time that the mechanical preparation on the site left mines 
exposed and in a dangerous condition (see Related Papers) so the secondary cause is listed 
as “Inadequate equipment”. Management revised demolition procedures because of a 
perceived increased risk, but apparently did not reconsider the manner in which the machines 
were deployed. This may be seen as a “Management/control inadequacy”.  
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was censored prior to being 
made available. 
 
Related papers 
In an exchange with one of the Field Supervisors at the site, the researcher asked the 
following: 
 
Q) It seems that several accidents involved spontaneous detonations of R2M2s after 
machines had worked in the area. Is this so? 
A) True the R2M2 had a strange habit of detonating without anything directly appearing to 
cause the mine to function. This did usually occur after a machine had been in the vicinity. 
Remember that we (the mechanical unit) were operating in advance of the manual follow up 
using bush-cutting equipment, bulldozers and the MineBuster excavator. I witnessed mines 
detonating without external influence personally – one went off 35m from my vehicle as I was 
travelling up the safety road.  
This happened only in the R2M2 areas and I suspect that the plastic assembly of the fuse 
housing was damaged (the plastic distorted) and although the metallic balls of the safety 
release had released, the distortion of the plastic prevented the firing spring from creeping 
forward and initiating the mine. When the heat of the day expanded the plastic, the spring was 
released and the pin forced into the stab-detonator. 
The thought of moving R2M2 mines in this condition - putting them into a pit to be destroyed 
(max 10 in a pit) – was unacceptable. So R2M2s found in areas after the machines had 
worked were burned in-situ. Other mines were still destroyed in pits.  
 
3 
